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Abstract. Th is paper discusses the relation between learning and adaptation, arguing 
that the current state of the art in semiotics suggests a continuity between the two. An 
overview of the relevant theories in this regard, as considered in semiotics, reveals an 
embodied and environmental account of learning, where language plays an important 
but nevertheless limited role. Learning and adaptation are seen as inseparable cases of 
semiotic modelling. Such a construal of these opens up new pathways towards a non-
dualist philosophy and theory of education.
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1. Introduction: Studying learning in relation to adaptation
Recent research in semiotics, which is reviewed below, has tended to emphasize the 
need for a reconceptualization of learning in relation to adaptation. More generally, 
the need for such an investigation stemmed from contemporary views, critical of 
modern dualist philosophy which contrasts learning to adaptation. In the classic, 
Enlightenment view, learning was construed as specifi cally human. More precisely, 
starting with early empiricism, rationalism and, particularly, contractualism, 
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learning has been conceived as the human species’ possibility of pulling itself 
out of a life of strictly biological needs and into a cultural existence. Ever since 
the contractualism of major modern philosophers such as Locke, Hobbes and 
Rousseau, educational theory and pedagogy have mostly been developing in view 
of this assumption. In line with more recent views on knowledge (e.g. Langer 
1957[1941]) and embodiment (e.g., Merleau-Ponty 1995; Polanyi 1964; Lakoff , 
Johnson 1999), we are critical of the anthropocentrism of modern philosophy, 
addressing this issue particularly in an educational context.While some social 
sciences have been more eager to consider the swift progress of the natural 
sciences, leading to disciplines such as ethology and sociobiology, we consider that 
pedagogy and socio-pedagogy tended to remain loyal to the classic assumptions 
of modern philosophy. Arguably, the humanities, which feed educational theory 
and philosophy, have proven particularly conservative and resilient towards a 
post-Enlightenment view (e.g., Martinelli 2016: 75; Cobley 2017: 9). For instance, 
(classic) anthropology (e.g. Boas 1938[1911]; Benedict 1934) assumed the under-
standing of culture of 18th- and 19th-century Romanticism, delivering it further 
on to the cultural studies of the 20th century, broadly, but now in awareness of 
Darwinism. Stjernfelt (2011) and Eriksen and Stjernfelt (2010, 2012) developed a 
thorough criticism of the mainstream theory of culture in classic anthropology, as 
received from German Romanticism. Particularly, the conservatism of educational 
studies blocks the development of an ecological concept of learning. Learning, we 
argue, should rather be conceived of in awareness of the environmental dimension 
of knowledge or, more broadly, the inter connectedness of epistemology and 
ecology. 
In one of the not many eff orts to systematically establish a complete theory 
of biosemiotics, Favareau (2010b: 3) sets as starting question a sharp critique 
of a historically enduring temptation of philosophy which seduced modernity: 
“How did modern science – the communal knowledge-generating system par 
excellence – arrive at this sterile impasse – one where the investigation of individual 
knowledge-generating systems as knowledge-generating systems per se has come 
to be seen, at best, as a vexingly paradoxical riddle and, at worst, as falling entirely 
outside the scope of legitimate scientifi c inquiry?” Approximately half a century 
before Favareau’s semiotic inquiry, Michael Polanyi had already placed the core 
of this problem on the agenda of phenomenological and embodied approaches 
to knowledge. Polanyi (1964: 6) considered that “all knowledge is acquired by 
indwelling”. Th is endorses the view that knowledge has a tacit aspect which escapes 
formal teaching and which any learner must discover on her own. In view of the 
modern construals of reason and knowledge, the teacher is meant to simply deliver 
to, or, at best, scaff old (e.g., Bruner 1957, 1990[1960], 1966) knowledge (in the 
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form of curricular subjects and topics) for the student. Th is also implies that the 
student’s knowledge can be assessed as relative to that of a supposedly objective 
curriculum, expressed in a scientifi cally accepted form, or to that of the teacher 
(for a semiotic, qualitative criticism of this view see Olteanu et al. 2015).
By discussing learning vis-à-vis adaptation from a semiotic perspective, the 
present paper aims to off er solutions for educational theory and philosophy, given 
the educational impasse resulting from the epistemological impasse discussed 
by Favareau. Like Favareau, we consider that the key to overcoming this sterility 
experienced lately in science in general, but particularly in the humanities, stands in 
a unifi ed theory of biology and meaning, namely “a semiotic paradigm for biology 
which considers that the biological form should be understood fi rst and foremost 
as a sign” (Lestel 2011[2002]: 388). If forms carry meanings it does not mean that 
form and meaning can be separated, in a Cartesian drive of clearly distinguishing 
one concept from another, or in the Saussurean fashion of diff erentiating between 
the signifi er and the signifi ed. Neither can any form be conventionally attributed 
any meaning, as the (so-called) arbitrariness hypothesis would claim. Biology 
accounts for a spectrum of meanings that a form aff ords within the horizon of an 
organism’s competences for meaning-making. Th is spectrum is a biology-aware 
account of the Vygotskian zone of proximal development (see Vygotsky 1978: 
84–85). Hoff meyer terms this ‘semiome’, in addition to the notion of genome. He 
claims that:
Evolution is primarily about the establishment of successful semiotic scaff olding 
devices, and genetic mutations are just elementary tools in this process that may 
oft en not rely on modifi cations at the genetic level at all. Th e genome thus is only 
half the story, the other half being the semiome, the entirety of semiotic tool sets 
available to the species: the means by which the organisms of a species may extract 
signifi cant content from their surroundings and engage in intra- or interspecifi c 
communicative behaviour (Hoff meyer 2014). Th e semiome defi nes the scope of 
the organism’s cognitive and communicative activity. (Hoff meyer 2015: 9)
To understand Hoff meyer’s claim one must keep in mind that semiosic activity 
(in line with Peirce’s defi nition of semiosis, CP 5.484) should not be confounded 
with, but is a prerequisite for cognition (see also Hoffmeyer, Stjernfelt 2016: 
8, 15). What falls outside the design possibilities of such spectra, as described 
above, should not be considered learning (in an educational concern) but, at best, 
mechanical repetition (reiteration). A student, for instance, might perform in a 
way that convinces the teacher that the student has truly understood the subject 
matter. However, the teacher cannot tell if what the student actually learned is the 
subject matter or only how to simulate its apprehension (for a discussion on some 
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implications for education of a biosemiotic account of scaff olding see Olteanu et 
al. 2015). In Polanyi’s terms, the teacher might well have access to a distal term 
that the student exposes, but has hardly any evidence for the proximal term of the 
student’s tacit knowledge. 
Th us, in what regards learning, consideration should be given to the role of 
the body for how it makes meaning articulation possible, while also confi ning 
it. According to Stjernfelt (2006) structuralism has established the tradition in 
semiotics of regarding the body as but another concept of language, pointing out 
the variance of representations of the human body across cultures and, thus, to 
the conventionalism involved even in understanding physiology. Th is subjects the 
body, and its role for the modelling of subjective environments, to the arbitrariness 
of meaning-form articulations, as supposed in the structuralist school. Instead, 
Stjernfelt (2006: 14) argues in favour of seeing “the body as a crucial prerequisite 
of semiotic articulation”. 
 
2. Criticism of modern philosophy of education
Favareau (2010b: 3) notices that while the instinctive starting point of the 
investigation which his question invites is René Descartes, the ontological 
demarcation in philosophy of matter and mind started long before. Along this 
long history of ontological dualism, which became the mainstream with Locke 
and Descartes, in the view of, among others, Donald Favareau (2010a) and John 
Deely (e.g., 2001), a non-dichotomic philosophical tradition also endured. Th is 
tradition is identifi ed with the rediscovery of the concept of sign by Charles Peirce, 
by Ferdinand de Saussure in a linguistic context1, and by Jakob von Uexküll in a 
biological context. In an educational regard, for now, the focus of such critique 
is justifi ed to address mainly the post-Cartesian, Enlightenment inheritance. 
More than other branches of theoretical philosophy, educational philosophy but 
also educational practice (schooling) remain anchored in the claims of modern 
1 Caution should be taken in attributing the arbitrariness hypothesis primarily to de Saussure. 
First, de Saussure limited his discussion to linguistic signs. Th e arbitrariness hypothesis mostly 
implies a sterile construal of learning as strictly conventional, symbolic calculus when applied 
to knowledge in general, not so much to language specifi cally. Second, the idea was both 
already present, albeit not explicitly, in cultural and linguistic theories and was extrapolated 
further on by structuralist philosophy’s (e.g. Derrida’s (1978[1967], 1981) insistence on the 
relation of opposition and his notion of ‘diff érance’), from de Saussure’s linguistic concern to 
knowledge in general. Also, some credit must be given to some Saussurean-inspired semiotics 
for attempting to undermine body/mind dualism (e.g. Deleuze, Guattari 1987[1980]; Lotman 
1977, 1990).
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dualism. Th e modern view of learning as strictly human has also consolidated 
a rigid account of adaptation, in strictly a Darwinist sense. Th e main problem 
that arises for education, not from the Darwinian theory of evolution, but from 
its uptake in a substance dualist philosophical frame, is that it makes adaptive 
strategies seem unintelligent or, so to say, brute physical changes caused by 
merely material factors (see Gough, Stables 2012: 371–372). Th is notion supposes 
that adaptations are strictly biological, occurring slowly, over generations, and 
that the individual organism or community has no control over them and their 
implications. In this view, adaptation refers to long-term and collective changes 
while learning usually refers to short-term changes in an individual. However, 
in everyday speech the word ‘adapt’ is insightfully used more loosely, covering a 
wider spectrum of situations. For instance, immigrants and refugees are required 
to ‘adapt’ to new cultural contexts, pupils ‘adapt’ to a new school, newlyweds ‘adapt’ 
to the married life and so on. 
Certain hypotheses in biosemiotics come in defense of the everyday speech 
use. According to Sharov et al. (2015: 361), biosemiotics diff ers from previous 
semiotic theories, focused on cultural signifi cation, by considering “the dynamics 
of semiosis at multiple time scales, and emphasizes the active role organisms 
have in reshaping sign relations”. Considering the evolution of meaning as the 
same type of phenomenon regardless of the timescale already suggests the need 
for bridging the classic adaptation/learning dichotomy. More of a fluidity of 
these two concepts is assumed in this view not only because of a more general 
understanding of ‘adaptation’, but also of ‘learning’. For instance, Stjernfelt (2012, 
2014, 2015) exposes a view according to which evolution itself learns. Namely, 
evolution learns to adapt (more effi  ciently) to structures of signifi cation. Stjernfelt 
considers that the biology of organisms became more complex as organisms 
begot more fi ne-tuned competences for dissecting complex semiotic structures 
into more simple composing parts (e.g. arguments into propositions, propositions 
into subjects and predicates, predicates into icons and so on). Th us, he explains 
that “semiotic evolution rather takes the shape of the ongoing subdivision, 
articulation, and sophistication of primitive signs, an ongoing refi nement of parts 
and aspects acquiring still more autonomy” (Stjernfelt 2012: 47). Th is is because 
the environment presents structures “which evolution as well as development are 
forced to adapt to” (Stjernfelt 2012: 40).
In this paper we advocate for the loosening of the concepts of adaptation and 
learning (at least) as used in education studies, by way of this semiotic framework. 
Th is leads to a general better understanding of their continuity. Consequently, we 
hope that this construal of learning will draw the attention of education studies 
towards semiotics.
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It is in light of its entailed theory of modelling that we consider that semiotics 
can revitalize educational theory and philosophy. To begin with, most of the 
contemporary acknowledged semiotic theories dismiss the dichotomical tension 
between learning, in a strictly cultural sense, and adaptation, in a strictly biological 
and physiological sense. The (relatively) recent development of biosemiotics 
suggests a turn in representation theories in general towards biocentrism and away 
from anthropocentrism (see Martinelli 2010: 318–325). Th is is to say that there 
is meaning widely in nature, not only in the rather narrow human semiosphere, 
which, taking over the global ecosystem, becomes an Anthropocene. The 
cornerstone that biosemiotics holds in this regard is its overarching use of the 
Peircean concept of semiosis, which during most of the 20th century has been 
used to discuss only cultural and social change (e.g. Eco 1976). Sharov et al. (2016: 
2) explain that biosemiotics “considers that evolution is semiosis, a process of 
continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of hereditary signs alongside 
other signs that originate in the environment or the body”. While the adaptation/
learning dichotomy particularly has been seldom addressed explicitly, many of its 
supporting dichotomies, such as, to begin with, individual/collectivity, and also 
agent/subject, verbal/nonverbal, human/non-human, matter/mind, living nature/
culture, have been discussed and dismissed in biosemiotics (e.g. Cobley 2010, 
2016). By this it is not implied that these notions are not distinct, but that they can 
be formulated in a relation other than dichotomous, which proves more insightful 
and adequate for current epistemological demands.
Moreover, the acceptance or dismissal of the modern polarized worldview 
has direct implications for learning. Cobley (2016: 126) mentions that, from a 
biosemiotic perspective, “not only are the binaries false oppositions but the 
human Umwelt, characterized by its constant drive to expand its range, should 
not allow such binaries to hinder its enrichment”. For this consideration, Cobley 
fi nds inspiration in Charles Peirce’s dictum, “Do not block the way of inquiry” 
(CP 1.135), following the latter’s idea that, like reality, knowledge is continuous. 
Umwelt, or the subjective environment of an organism, is the model by which the 
organism knows its own world phenomenally. Th is concept, originating in Jakob 
von Uexküll’s (1926) theoretical biology and adopted in semiotics via the works of 
Th omas Sebeok (see 1991, 2001a[1994]), brings together adaptation and learning 
as forms of interpretation by which models of the world are constructed and 
refi ned. According to von Uexküll, umwelt (environment) is a functional cycle (or 
circle, Funktionkreis) of perception and action signs (see Uexküll 2010[1934]: 49). 
Loops of such signs account for a world populated by subjective meaning-carriers, 
rather than objective entities that present to the perceiving organism nothing 
other than their immediate presence. On this account, an element of subjectivity 
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is justifi ed in scientifi c inquiry, as knowledge itself belongs to embodied organisms 
that cannot be otherwise than subjective. 
Th us, the need for redefi ning learning in relation to adaptation was mainly 
observed in semiotics in two ways: not only (1) within the developing semiotic 
research on education, loosely termed edusemiotics (see Semetsky 2010; Olteanu 
2015; Stables, Semetsky 2015) but, also, (2) in biosemiotics, the semiotic theory of 
biological modelling. 
3. Learning results in change
We advance a notion of learning as change that is seen as signifi cant. Learning 
always changes us in some way and the everyday use of the term ‘adaptation’ is 
not far from this understanding of learning. By contrast, Darwin’s conception 
of adaptation is too narrow for claiming that all learning produces (Darwinian) 
species adaptation. Rather, we argue, in addition to the post-darwinian realization 
that epigenetics stops genetically identical individuals from being actually 
identical, there always is a certain scope for freedom of action within a biologically 
determined organism. Any embodied organism is equipped with some semiotic 
competences, stemming from the morphology of the body itself, which render the 
organism a corresponding (semiotic) freedom (Stjernfelt 2006). Th is is a semiotic 
validation of what is termed the Baldwin eff ect, namely the idea that learning 
enhances evolution (Baldwin 1896, see also Hoff meyer, Kull 2003). Th us, we 
consider that biology needs to examine the concept of adaptation in the context 
of tool use generally and, particularly, of media changes (specifi cally digitization, 
for contemporary concerns) and advanced science (e.g., prosthetics). At the same 
time, educationalists need to get used to the idea that ‘learning’ cannot validly 
be seen as a purely cognitive, mental process unconnected to physical change. 
Every experience/event is a (sort of) utterance written onto, into and by the 
body, as already evidenced by Stjernfelt (2014) in a bio- and cognitive-semiotic 
framework. 
In a recent discussion on education, and in the eff ort of developing a semiotic 
theory of education, Gough and Stables (2012) straightforwardly approached 
this topic, arguing that interpretation can be construed as a case of adaptation. 
In general, semiotics regards learning as a matter of interpretation. Learning is 
a hermeneutical endeavour. Gough and Stables’ argument proved particularly 
insightful, as, even though recent, by the time of its publication, semiotic research 
on education had not yet manifestly discovered its affi  nities with biosemiotics. 
Since Th omas Sebeok’s pioneering research (e.g. Sebeok 1991, 2001a), the semiotic 
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theory of biology (biosemiotics) has been founded on the premise that speech, 
as manifest in Homo sapiens, evolved as an exaptation, accidentally possible 
due to certain previous adaptations. Th e hypothesis of speech as the result of an 
exaptation holds that existing, typically mammalian, features for respiration and 
ingestion were made use of by Homo erectus, in a way that they were probably not 
designed for, namely for producing phonemes (see MacLarnon 2012: 225). Th us, 
the modern human being, with its specifi c capacity for culture and technology, is 
not possible due to a mutation that proved useful, but due to an innovative use 
of physiological features that had developed for diff erent purposes. Th at speech 
resulted and was developed beginning from an exaptation, and not an adaptation 
in the Darwinian sense, means that the development of speech was not inevitable, 
but it was a physiological possibility that was made use of when environmental 
conditions favoured it. By environmental we mean not only external physical 
conditions, but the organism-context signifying relations, or umwelt, in Uexküllian 
terminology. Such an exaptation, of course, changes the species’ environment 
(umwelt) in its own turn. 
Vocal communication has proven highly effi  cient and constitutes a considerable 
survival advantage of humans. More than merely for survival, over time, vocal 
communication in the form of speech has profound hermeneutical consequences. 
Th e re-modelling of the environment that speech produced in humans, however, 
does not overrule previously existing modelling competences. Rather, it adds 
to them. Perhaps it remodels, it fine-tunes, previously existing modelling 
competences, but it does not plunge the human species into an altogether diff erent 
reality, detached from the natural, biological world. Th e primary, pre-existing 
modelling competences of humans are nonverbal and, as the exaptative emergence 
of speech suggests, verbal but not vocal. According to Stjernfelt the reason for the 
adaptive success of speech is that it off ers a fi ner grasp and use of Subject-Predicate 
structures, which are essential for survival and for navigating the environment. 
In light of Peirce’s sign taxonomy, Stjernfelt argues that speech highly facilitated 
a use of propositions in their linguistic form, which is more precise and renders 
a higher semiotic control than the more wobbly use of what can be called proto-
propositions. Th e latter are signs consisting of a dual structure composed of (1) 
an index and (2) an icon describing the index qualitatively (Hoff meyer, Stjernfelt 
2016: 26; see also Stjernfelt 2014: 144). Th is argument, of course, stands only in 
view of the notion of semiosis as not dependent upon cognition, like in the case 
of Hoff meyer’s argument for the semiome defi ning the scope of cognition and 
communication. Moreover, Stjernfelt explains that neither does the presence of 
semiosis imply consciousness, a position which should be most attractive for 
 Learning and adaptation from a semiotic perspective  417
philosophy, as it avoids the ever perilous and oft en dualism-endorsing discussions 
on this topic2:
Signs which may not convey truth are hardly effi  cient in biology: isolated icons 
only indicating vague possibilities have little if any pragmatic effi  ciency in 
cognition and communication, just like isolated indices only able to indicate 
that something is happening at a location but not what it is, may be of restricted, 
local use but not much more than that. Th is is why Dicisigns3 are ubiquitous in 
biology. Th is may seem hard for both biologists and biosemioticians to appreciate, 
probably because of the widespread idea that propositions require judgement 
of a conscious “propositional stance” found only in human beings as well as the 
whole of the machinery of human language to express those propositions. Here, 
Peirce’s purely semiotic defi nition of the proposition as a Dicisign combining two 
signs into one irreducible whole gives us a formal notion of Dicisign – neither 
presupposing consciousness nor explicit acts of judging. (Stjernfelt 2014: 144)
The exaptation hypothesis regarding speech also demystifies the supposed 
overwhelming consequences of writing. Stjernfelt’s theory of natural propositions 
is supported as well by this hypothesis, as it explains that the rationale behind 
the emergence and development of spoken language is the communication of 
existing models of existing structures. From the (bio)semiotic point of view, where 
environments are the result of modelling and, thus, are models, writing and speech 
stem from the same modelling system and are both developed in view of the 
same function. Th at is to say, writing is speech which is not verbally, but visually 
reproduced. Both speech and writing are thus labelled to belong to the secondary 
level of modelling systems. Secondary modelling systems have the peculiar feature 
of functioning monomodally: while speech does not require visualization, writing 
does not require hearing. Each entails another characteristic, further on, which can 
be an advantage or disadvantage, according to context: speech disappears in a short 
2 However, in their semiotic approach to evolution, Hoff meyer and Stjernfelt (2016) still 
pursue and argue for a notion of (self-)consciousness, as a late and advanced evolutionary 
development requiring cognition. We consider that this discussion of what aft er all is an 
empirically non-verifi able concept, namely consciousness, could be avoided. 
3 ‘Dicisign’ or ‘Dicent Sign’ is Peirce’s general concept of a general proposition, encompassing 
of sensory modalities. In Peirce’s taxonomy it is situated as the sign that describes its Interpretant 
in relation to its Object: “A Dicent Sign is a Sign, which, for its Interpretant, is a Sign of actual 
existence. It cannot, therefore, be an Icon, which aff ords no ground for an interpretation of 
it as referring to actual existence. A Dicisign necessarily involves, as a part of it, a Rheme, to 
describe the fact which it is interpreted as indicating. But this is a peculiar kind of Rheme; and 
while it is essential to the Dicisign, it by no means constitutes it” (CP 2.251).
418 Alin Olteanu, Andrew Stables
span of time and the one who produces it can remain hidden to agents to which it 
wants to remain hidden, while writing remains perceivable for a longer period of 
time, which means that it can be produced and still communicate at a later date, 
being also effi  cient for recording. 
Th is is important to acknowledge in education, as the modern educational 
paradigm, of which we here develop a criticism, tended to consider writing 
systems as a feature that empowers human education all the more, proving the 
detachment from the bio- and zoo-sphere of the human species. Reading and 
writing are the fi rst skills to be taught in schooling. Th us, as even the word itself 
suggests, literacy mainly consists in reading and writing skills. From a biosemiotic 
perspective, the basic skills for surviving and thriving in society should consist 
in ways of understanding the environment that evoke semiotic resources. Th e 
conceptualization of speech and writing as altogether diff erent linguistic systems 
was explicitly stated by de Saussure (1959 [1916]: 23–24) and further exploited in 
linguistics in general, particularly in functional linguistics (Martinet 1962: 59), 
which has since determined to a large extent the course of research in phonetics 
and phonology (see Akamatsu 2009). However, as seen in the study of phonetics 
and phonology, a new critical direction emerges once with the hypothesis that 
spoken language resulted from exaptation (Gould, Vrba 1982; see also MacLarnon 
2012 and more below).
Th at speech and vocal (as well as written) language became possible because of 
evolutionary features occurring for reasons other than linguistic communication is 
critical for how we conceive human knowledge and behaviour. It allowed Sebeok 
to argue that these are not primarily dependent on linguistic classifi cation. Sebeok 
adopted the semiotic modelling theory of Juri Lotman (e.g. Lotman 1977), albeit 
contributing to it with a major revision, namely that humans have three, not two, 
modelling systems. To the linguistic and the supra-linguistic (cultural, scientifi c 
etc.) modelling systems supposed by Lotman, Sebeok added a non-linguistic 
modelling system, which, in view of the exaptation hypothesis, is prior to the 
others: “A concept of ‘modelling systems’ has been central to the semiotics of the 
so-called Moscow-Tartu school since the 1960s, but, having been derived from a 
representation of language in structural linguistics, it focused on culture to the 
exclusion of the rest of nature” (Sebeok 2001a: 26–27).
4. Learning is not only linguistic
Sebeok remarked that communication and linguistic theories cannot make 
abstraction of nonverbal communication, which is much more spread in nature 
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than verbal communication, the latter being quite specifi c to humans (e.g., Sebeok 
2001b). Learning, it is important to mention, is not specifi cally human. While we 
agree with Sebeok, we also point out the insight that common parlance suggests. 
It is a biological truth that modelling systems based on the verbal modality require 
the pre-existence of nonverbal modelling systems. To Sebeok’s foundation of 
biosemiotics, we add the observation that ‘adaptation’ is used in everyday speech 
to refer to changes in form and behaviour as the result of changed responses to 
environment. On this account, adaptation is a sort of sustained change, which 
qualifi es it as a tendency or habit, on a Peircean account. However, in Darwinian 
biology, adaptation refers to physical changes within species that take place slowly, 
through generations. Exaptation itself is a form of adaptation, in the loose, everyday 
speech sense. Following Dennett (1996), in view of the coevolution school(s) of 
language evolution, Scalia (2019: 96) argues the other way around, namely that “all 
adaptation is exaptation” as an adaptation opens up new (accidental) modelling 
possibilities. While worded vice versa, Scalia’s hypothesis is compatible with the 
present argument that exaptation is a form of adaptation. Both of these theories 
account that, for instance, brain plasticity and kinesio-semiotic competencies are 
mutually dependent (see Scalia 2019: 99). 
Exaptation is a different phenomenon than the Darwinian account of 
adaptation, or at least as it has been perpetrated in neo-Darwinism. Th is strictly 
Darwinian and biologically evolutionary notion of adaptation is not aligned 
with the biosemiotic view on evolution, (partly) inspired from Peirce’s theory of 
evolution (CP 1.103–1.109, 6.287–6.317). On this Darwinian account, all change to 
an individual does not count as adaptation. Some more recent theories of evolution 
and ecology come in support of the popular understanding of ‘adaptation’. For 
instance, Bateson’s account (Bateson 1972) of systems theory differentiates 
between phenotypical and genotypical changes (other work distinguishes between 
genetics and epigenetics) and also between temporary and enduring changes. Th at 
is, every individual has a certain level of adaptability (in the everyday sense) or 
“wriggle room” to respond to everyday challenges, but this level of adaptability is 
constrained by genetic make-up and epigenetics (which genes are active within the 
individual). Th us, adaptation in the Darwinian, species sense, sets the parameters 
for individual adaptability on the day-to-day level. 
If all biological organisms have an embodied, non-linguistic modelling system, 
as according to Sebeok (2001b: 14), it can be inferred that all organisms make sense 
of their environment(s) as according to the meaning-making competences that 
their embodied morphology aff ords. Stjernfelt (2006) discussed this implication 
of biosemiotics. Also, from an embodied and cognitive semiotics point of view, 
Pelkey argues that the relevance of X-patterns (chiasmus) for meaning-making in 
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humans stems from our body’s morphology (Pelkey 2017). Th e correlation between 
embodied morphology and meaning has profound consequences for learning, 
contradicting not only mind/body Cartesianism but also the anthropocentric 
notions of learning and of education which dominated Western philosophy and 
pedagogy (at least) starting with the Enlightenment (see also Scalia 2019: 92 and 
Olteanu 2018). To begin with, that a physiology which aff ords speech production 
developed speech, as an exaptation, and led to the evolution from Homo erectus 
to Homo sapiens, blurs the supposed delineation between biological adaptation 
and cultural learning. Th is example illustrates a capacity in hominid species of 
creatively and purposefully using an accidental semiotic resource, leading to the 
development of new semiotic competences. By no means does it exclude creativity 
in other species, of course. It is diffi  cult to overestimate the consequences of this 
semiotic competence, which go beyond the immediate purpose of those hominids 
who started using it and developed (the fi rst elements of) verbal language. Th e 
process is neither strictly biological, nor strictly cultural. The biological and 
the cultural and the individual and the collective aspects are inseparable in an 
environmental modelling with complex consequences. Herein is noticeable 
how a (fully) semiotic account of adaptation is in contradiction with the classic 
Darwinian one.
Starting from Sebeok’s consideration that the “strategic anthroposemiotics/
zoosemiotics dichotomy will stand, just as long as the riddle of the origin of 
human language remains unsolved” (Sebeok 1985: 299), Scalia (2019: 90) argues 
that a semiotic framework for studying the evolution of language can unify the 
otherwise scattered puzzle pieces that various disciplines have unravelled on this 
matter. Th e main argument that Scalia brings in favour of a semiotic theory of 
language evolution, inherited from Sebeok, is the supposition of the continuity 
of meaning throughout the biosphere (an idea, in turn, inherited from Peirce, 
as discussed below). Th us, from this perspective, language is studied within the 
overall complexity of a semiobiosphere.
5. Exaptation as a sub-case of adaptation
From a Darwinian perspective (Darwin 2008[1859]) adaptation to environment 
is regarded in very much observable physical structural terms (e.g., growing new 
limbs, such as wings, or becoming smaller or bigger, over many generations). On 
this account, adaptation does not encompass the potentially long-term changes 
brought about in humans (at least) through changed environmental interactions, 
such as occur, for instance, via technology. For example, we have adapted to air 
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travel, but not by changing hands to wings; rather, we have invented aeroplanes. 
Now, this will have changed the human species in some way, but not necessarily in 
terms of observable physical structure. Nevertheless, the consequences over very 
long periods of time of humans’ adaptation (or exaptation) to fl ight are impossible 
to overestimate. Not only did air travel lead to diff erent social organizations, with 
everything that these entail, but (like other similar examples) it is also an important 
step from the environmental transformation from holocene to anthropocene 
(Crutzen, Stoermer 2000; see Steff en et al. 2011; Rockström et al. 2009). It might 
also prove (like other similar examples) very useful in the attempt to come 
closer to the environmental balance of the holocene. Like any use of semiotic 
competences, it simultaneously evokes new semiotic resources and possibilities 
while also obstructing others. While burning fuel, air travel might arguably have 
uses for ecological purposes. Another consideration is that while fl ight did not 
produce observable physical changes in humans, it is not impossible that, over 
time, it might. It is not to be excluded that the habit of air travel, over generations, 
might lead to growing physically weaker, as our backs may be adapting to sitting, 
and even to impacting on our brain biology and chemistry. Th ese could only be 
speculations for now, but they fi nd abductive justifi cation in evolutionary theories.
Sebeok’s theory is not dismissive of the profound changes that exaptations 
(can) have. From a biosemiotic perspective, language plays an important role in 
knowledge acquisition. Th e emergence of language is, to begin with, considered 
an evolutionary phenomenon because, by its effi  ciency to communicate complex 
meaning structures, it allows for and implies new modelling capacities. Language 
also proves of great pragmatic value. As discussed above, it is very effi  cient at 
representing subject-predicate structures (propositions). These are complex 
meaning structures, the use of which is critical for the survival of any animals 
and possibly also some plants and bacteria (see Stjernfelt 2014:144; Hoff meyer, 
Stjernfelt 2016: 16), because of their pivotal role in both the development of 
syllogistic arguments and the identifi cation of simpler, composing sign-relations, 
such as indexes and predicates, from which factual information can be derived. 
It is most relevant that, from its beginning, biosemiotics was defi ned by Sebeok 
(e.g. 1991, 2001a) as a modelling theory and, while useful for cognitive theories 
as well, it does not impose any particular assumption about cognition. Th us, from 
this perspective, a theory of learning does not necessarily imply a discussion on 
cognition. An educational theory and system can conceive learning in terms 
of signifi cation only. Th is might prove useful because it raises awareness of the 
freedom of individuals to learn, regardless of limitations supposed because of 
cognitive capacities, social power relations or economic situation. Learning is 
interpreting: by learning something, a knowing subject remodels her environment 
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as she discovers new sign-relations. Rather than being limited by cognitive 
capacities and socio-economic status, learning is better understood as limited by 
environmental relations. Th e environment presents semiotic resources according to 
the way in which an organism relates to it. As such, what limits learning coincides 
with what makes it possible, namely the organism’s interpretative framework, 
understood phenomenologically, as explained elsewhere by Stables (2012: 46). 
In this view, learning is ecological, always dependent on organism-environment 
relations. Th us, such a semiotic theory of learning is akin to the idea of human 
activity proceeding within the frame of ecological constraints, such as planetary 
boundaries (Rockström et al. 2009). 
Th e potential semiotic resources, however, are enormous, if not infi nite, at least 
for higher biological organisms, with complex cognitive systems. Social, economic, 
cultural and even cognitive features are only learning parameters within the greater 
environmental picture, if the environment is to be understood in a suprasubjective 
(borrowing this term from Deely 2001) sense, encompassing both the biological 
and the cultural, in virtue of the continuity of signifi cation throughout these 
spheres. Th e limitation of each of these parameters can be, to a large degree, 
supplemented and overcome by the use of others. The discovery of semiotic 
resources, according to semiotic competences, produces, in turn, new semiotic 
competences. Th us, creativity is understood neither as strictly a cognitive feature 
nor as entirely dependent on the individual or on environmental circumstance. It 
is rather easy to agree that Einstein, Picasso and Maradona were all creative but 
discovered and used diff erent semiotic resources, modelling their environments 
diff erently. To claim that one of these is “more intelligent” than the others refl ects 
a rigid modern understanding of “intelligence”, oft en construed as dependent on 
reason in a (post-) Cartesian sense. 
With his biosemiotic project Sebeok intended to explain modelling in the 
biosphere in terms of phenomena of signifi cation. Th is intention is justifi ed by 
(what is now called) the Sebeok hypothesis, namely that life and meaning are co-
extensive. Meaning is continuous throughout the biosphere. Sebeok found this 
idea expressed in two theories of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, namely the 
semiotic logic of Charles Peirce (e.g. CP 6.272–6.286) and the theoretical biology 
of Jakob von Uexküll (e.g. 1926, 2010[1934, 1940]). Charles Peirce considered that 
a doctrine of continuity must be the cornerstone of pragmatism, a philosophical 
project that he conceived as overcoming ontological dualism (CP 5.415). He 
named this doctrine ‘synechism’ (CP 6.169). Further on, upon his maxim of 
pragmatism (e.g., CP 5.438), Peirce developed a theory of logic expressed in terms 
of signs. Signifi cation, thus, appears as the continuous phenomenon (or set(s) 
of phenomena) that, as it were, glues reality together. Similarly, in a biological 
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concern, von Uexküll’s theory acknowledges that in the biosphere, ecosystems and 
individual organisms’ life-worlds are not separated from one another, as elements 
of a discrete set. Th is led Sebeok to explain that Uexküll’s concept of environment 
(umwelt, as coined in the original German) is a model which more than merely 
constituting organisms’ understandings of their phenomenality, also constitutes 
organisms’ means of communicating: 
All organisms communicate by use of models (umwelts, or self-worlds, each 
according to its species-specifi c sense organs), from the simplest representations 
of manoeuvres of approach and withdrawal to the most sophisticated cosmic 
theories of Newton and Einstein. (Sebeok 2001a: 23)
As Stables (2012) recently explained, an epistemological advantage of contempora-
ry semiotics is its means of easily accounting for the overlapping of phenomenal 
worlds. Th is idea is present in von Uexküll’s theoretical biology as well: “Th e 
function-circles of the various animals connect up with one another in the most 
various ways, and together form the function-world of living organisms, within 
which plants are included” (Uexküll 1926: 126).4
Th e precise number and layering of modelling systems that humans or other 
species (in comparison) master is not our concern here. What is important is the 
hypothesis that all organisms model their environment and that language, while a 
powerful modelling system, does not and cannot overwrite how the human animal, 
given its pre-linguistic modelling competencies and aff ordances, understands its 
environment. Th e modelling capacities of any animal relate to a basic internal 
model that could not be verbal or, for that matter, of any acquired modality: “Th e 
Innenwelt of every animal comprises a model […] that is made up of an elementary 
array of several types of nonverbal signs […]” (Sebeok 2001a[1994]: 145).
In awareness of this, semiotics offers a bridge between the humanities in 
general, and the natural sciences. Th is could well be a way out of the crisis that 
the humanities have been recently facing (regarding the crisis of the humanities 
see Nussbaum 2010 and Martinelli 2016, and for how biosemiotics can tackle the 
crisis see Cobley 2017). 
Sebeok’s adoption of the exaptation hypothesis (see Sebeok 1991: 56) is 
grounded in the same study that established it in the natural sciences and in 
4 Th e authors are aware that this English translation of von Uexküll’s Th eoretische Biologie 
received some criticism and, also, that the German word ‘Funktionskreis’ does not have a 
straightforward translation to English. However, to this date there is no unanimously accepted 
English translation of this book. Also, we consider that for the limited purpose of this article, 
the translation is acceptable.
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evolutionary anthropology, namely the celebrated article of Gould and Vrba 
(1982). Gould and Vrba, as well, justifi ed the need for a concept of exaptation 
by starting from a taxonomical confusion caused by the unclear delimitation of 
adaptation in a strictly Darwinian sense and in its vernacular use (Gould, Vrba 
1982: 4–5). Th us, to retain a strictly Darwinian use of the ‘adaptation’ term in 
evolutionary biology, they proposed the term ‘exaptation’ to refer to “features 
of organisms” which are “non-adapted, but available for useful cooptation in 
descendants” (Gould, Vrba 1982: 4). Such features, they argue, “enhance fi tness 
but were not built by natural selection for their current role” (Gould, Vrba 1982: 4). 
As mentioned, and as received by Sebeok, we agree with the conceptual diff erence 
between Darwinian adaptation and exaptation but, particularly in light of more 
recent research in biosemiotics (e.g., Hoff meyer 2015; Hoff meyer, Stjernfelt 2016; 
see Sharov et al. 2015, 2016), we argue for the need of expanding the sense of the 
terms ‘adaptation’ and ‘learning’, in view of eliminating the dichotomy. Actually, 
the diff erence between adaptation and exaptation is necessary for an accurate and 
adequate notion of learning as ecological. Th e key stands in seeing exaptation as a 
semiosic sub-case of adaptation, in a broad sense. Th is idea is already suggested by 
Hoff meyer’s semiotic version of the idea of knowledge acquisition as ‘scaff olding’ 
(Hoff meyer 2006, 2015; Hoff meyer, Stjernfelt 2016; see also Kull 2015 and Olteanu, 
Campbell 2018: 253–254), or, as similarly expressed by Kleisner (2015), ‘semiotic 
co-option’.
While evolutionary anthropology (e.g., MacLarnon 2012) advanced and eagerly 
accepted the hypothesis of language as exaptated, cultural and communication 
studies generally developed in ignorance of this, favouring the epistemological 
language-centredness of 20th-century philosophy and linguistics. In this view, 
language and speech have been misconstrued as an inevitable biological hardwiring 
of humans (or, specifi cally, of Homo sapiens), which places this species on an 
altogether diff erent existential plane than the rest of the animal realm. Mainstream 
cultural anthropology (see Eriksen, Stjernfelt 2012: 134, Cobley 2016: 18) and 
sociolinguistics (see Randviir, Cobley 2010: 119) are included here. For instance, 
Elleström (2018, 2019) recently noticed that communication studies are in want 
of a communication model that, fi rst of all, takes into consideration non-verbal 
communication, and, subsequently, does so not in analogy to the verbal. While 
this pertinent claim was convincingly argued for only recently, Sebeok included 
this awareness as a founding rationale of biosemiotics almost half a century ago. 
Th us, biosemiotic theory can deliver the exaptation hypothesis, together with a 
full-blown modelling theory, to the vast area of communication studies. As regards 
cultural studies, Cobley (2010, 2016) opened the avenue for a non-dualist and non-
anthropocentric framework, by recommending a biosemiotic approach, whereby 
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“human aff airs”, inclusive of all human culture, “are sought in the interrogation of 
modelling” (Cobley 2016: 28).
6. Learning as semiotically embodied 
In view of these considerations, a theory of learning has to take into account those 
ecological relations that render semiotic resources and competences for modelling, 
that is, “a body concept which entails semiotics” (Stjernfelt 2006: 14). Th e need 
for a semiotic notion of the body and its implications have been discussed by 
Stjernfelt (2006) and Hoff meyer (2008). From this perspective, a correspondence 
between semiotic competences and behaviour is claimed, accounting for an 
only partial and limited (re)modelling produced by languaged-behaviour. Th e 
concept of competence has been widely debated in education studies (e.g., Barnett 
1994; Westera 2001; Mulder et al. 2009). Recently, Pikkarainen (2014) discussed 
the implications for education of a semiotic concept of competence (see also 
Pikkarainen’s article in this issue).5 
Th e concept of semiotic competence seems to have initially emerged from that 
of literary competence (see Culler 1980: 109–110), stemming from Chomskyan 
(Chomsky 1965) and Saussurean linguistics. These accounts of linguistic 
competence neither take into consideration the body’s role in learning nor are they 
concerned with the subjective process of learners’ acquisition of concepts. Nöth 
observes that, like Greimas and Courtés’ (1982[1979]) notion of semio-narrative 
structures and de Saussure’s ‘langue’, Chomsky’s notion of competence underpins 
a fundamental grammar (Nöth 1995: 315–316). Th is concept of competence is 
an intrinsic characteristic of language itself rather than descriptive of sign-users’ 
learning possibilities. Such holistic views on language, where instances of linguistic 
performance (‘parole’, to use a Saussurean term) are restricted by the language 
(Saussure’s ‘langue’) itself, suppose little (if at all) semiotic freedom from behalf 
of the users. According to Kress (2010: 28) if language is “regarded as a means 
fully capable of dealing with all human (rational) meaning” then the resources 
for meaning-making that language or any such singular and universal mode 
of representation contain are obscured to its users. Because our environment, 
as formed by our sense-perception capabilities, is multimodal, resources for 
modelling are evoked in the inter-relations of (sensory) modes (see Kress 2010: 
27–28). Th is is because semiotic tools, such as sensory-motor possibilities, the 
5 For instance, an interesting research avenue that semiotics seized is the criticism of 
institutionalized conventions on teaching and learning, such as, among others, the construal 
of ‘student ability’ (Stables et al. 2018).
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various sense perception channels, cognition, co-evolved together. Th is hypothesis 
is eagerly embraced in biosemiotics (from Damasio 1994, and mostly starting with 
Deacon 1997; see Cobley 2016: 56) and particularly in its approaches to the body 
(Hoff meyer 2008: 179) and language evolution (Scalia 2019, see above). Th us, 
capabilities of discovering resources for meaning are, to begin with, multimodal 
and, therefore, the resources themselves are multimodal as according to the specifi c 
umwelt. In this case, competences for discovering meaning, whatever they might 
be, have to be thought of in relation to semiotic resources. Following Kress’ 
reasoning (e.g. 2003, 2010) this points out to the need of a multimodal semiotic 
rather than a linguistic monomodal construal of meaning making. Th is justifi es 
Cobley’s argument for developing cultural criticism (and not only) in terms of 
modelling (Cobley 2016, see above). 
In a secondary language teaching purpose, attempting to overcome the rigidity 
of teaching methods supposed by the assumption that verbal fl uency depends on 
communicative or linguistic competencies, Danesi (2000: 43) argues in favour of 
a notion of semiotic competence as stemming from cognitive linguistics. Drawing 
on the conceptual metaphor theory of Lakoff  and Johnson6 (1980, 1999) and 
on Langacker’s (1987, 1990) cognitive approach to grammar, Danesi (2000: 42) 
defi nes semiotic competence as “the ability to interrelate the underlying structure 
of concepts to the surface grammar and vocabulary that refl ects them”. Th is is a 
more learner-centred, rather than language-centred, perspective on competence, 
admitting a higher degree of subjectivity and, implicitly, a higher degree of freedom 
in sign-use. Danesi considers not only that the framework of cognitive linguistics, 
with its awareness of cognition as embodied, is properly semiotic, but also that, 
unlike previous notions of linguistic and semiotic competence, “it has provided 
the theoretical coordinates for investigating semiotic competence in terms of its 
educational implications” (Danesi 2000: 43). However, it might still limit modelling 
and cognitive competences as relative to a top-down, normative imposition of 
sign systems upon sign-users. According to Danesi (2000: 14), “the ability to 
interconnect verbal and conceptual structures in speech” is sought in “culturally-
appropriate ways”. While inspired by pioneering research on embodied cognition 
and admittedly not discussing learning beyond the scope of secondary language 
acquisition, this account also subjects semiotic competence to a nature/culture 
dichotomy by not fully considering the role of the body in language learning. For 
instance, Danesi (2000: 23) also argues that body language constitutes a “cultural 
grammar”, emphasizing the culture-specifi c role of the body and the variations of 
6 Kress argues that his social semiotic theory of multimodal communication rests as well on 
Lakoff  and Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory (see Kress 2010: 55). 
 Learning and adaptation from a semiotic perspective  427
body concepts across cultures. Th is makes Danesi’s argument a target of Stjernfelt’s 
criticism of the tradition in semiotics that regards the body as a language- or 
culture-dependent concept much more than acknowledging the body as the 
essential prerequisite for the possibility of meaning articulation. Consequently, it 
does not take into consideration that semiotic competences stem from the body’s 
morphology (Stjernfelt 2006, see above). Nevertheless, in Danesi’s approach to 
language education, the acquisition of verbal skills is seen as connected to body 
language (Danesi 2000: 22). Th is already supposes a multimodal dimension of 
language, which thus consists in more than merely a lexicon and some rules. 
It is also worth noting that in other places Danesi takes a more embodied and 
modelling-centred approach to knowledge (e.g. Sebeok, Danesi 2000; Danesi 
2003). 
Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s (1995) phenomenology of the body, Stjernfelt 
claims that semiotic competence, the organism’s capabilities of making sense of 
the environment, starts with the body’s morphology. In a subtle argumentation, 
Hoff meyer (2008) stresses the critical role that the skin has for any human’s sense 
of self. Th e skin is the organ that simultaneously encapsulates the body and opens 
it up to the outer world: 
Th e semiotics of the skin encompasses numerous other elements beyond those 
associated with the senses of feeling and pain. Generally, the skin might be 
considered a user interface that couples us to the outer world. On one hand, the 
skin thus serves us as a kind of topological boundary; while, on the other hand, 
its semiotic capacity opens up the world to us – so that the question of where 
our ‘self ’ begins and ends is not at all an easy question to answer scientifi cally. 
(Hoff meyer 2008: 173)
Moreover, Hoff meyer (2008: 172) locates (the origin) of personhood in the skin:
[…] it is the skin that tells us about the person we are, as well as about the 
people (and the world) that we are facing: color, form, energy, and smell provide 
a constant barrage of information exchange for and among humans, across the 
interface that is the skin. 
Th is embodied understanding of self and personhood has profound consequences 
for conceptualizing learning. First of all, all animals that are wrapped up in skin 
start to learn about their place in the world through their skin. Th is already places 
learning on the same evolutionary spectrum with adaptive and exaptive processes. 
Also, most importantly, such a concept frames learning as implicitly environmental: 
all learning, as it were, passes through the skin. It consists in loops of both 
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exosemiosis and endosemiosis: what happens outside the boundaries of the skin is 
perceived and processed within those boundaries, leading to behavioural decisions 
that result in change for both the individual organism and the environment. Th is 
does not imply a cybernetic concept of the body and environment, where the 
body simply receives inputs from and sends back outputs to an outer environment. 
Exosemiosis and endosemiosis proceed together, in a relation of complementarity, 
as made possible but also restricted by that morphology which, in the case of 
complex organisms that have this organ, is wrapped in skin. Th is idea is present 
in von Uexküll’s theoretical biology. From the way in which Uexküll defi ned his 
concept of umwelt, the idea of the co-evolution of organisms and environmental 
factors is already implied:
Every animal is a subject, which, in virtue of the structure peculiar to it, selects 
[or chooses]7 stimuli from the general infl uences of the outer world, and to these it 
responds in a certain way. Th ese responses, in their turn, consist of certain eff ects 
on the outer world, and these again infl uence the stimuli. In this way there arises a 
self-contained periodic cycle, which we may call the function-circle of the animal. 
(Uexküll 1926: 126)
In view of this, Nöth (1998: 339) remarks that “Umwelt and the inner world […] 
constitute[s] a hermeneutic circle”, thus revealing one of the most impressive and 
critical contributions that (contemporary) semiotics has to off er to current theories 
of epistemology, ecology and learning: it accounts for the interpretative dimension 
of embodiment (see also Levesque’s 2016 proposal of semiotics as supportive of 
ecosophy). Th is is to claim, with Stables (2012: 46, see above) that what limits 
learning coincides with what opens up learning possibilities. Th is plasticity starts 
with the skin. Th at the animal can select (or choose) elements from the outer world 
for semiosic modelling means that the landscape presents to the animal objects 
that, in a fi rst phenomenological instance, have a certain neutrality:
[…] the perception of neutral objects is, of course, a prerequisite to learning because 
learning in some sense consists of nothing but the de-neutralization of neutral 
objects, drawing them into segments of functional circles. In order to be thus 
invested with meaning, neutral objects, of course, must be phenomenologically 
presented before learning. Th e perfect fi t between organism and environment 
must thus be relativized: life time adaptability presupposes to some degree the 
perception of neutral objects which are not immediately functionally relevant. 
(Stjernfelt 2006: 23–24)
7 Kalevi Kull suggested this nuance of translation to the authors.
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7. Concluding
We have argued that a simple distinction between Darwinian adaptation and 
humanist/modernist conceptions of learning is reductive and grounded in 
Cartesian dualism. A conception of semiotic modelling, drawing on Sebeok 
among others, allows us to acknowledge that not all learning is conscious (see 
also Hoff meyer, Stjernfelt 2016), that long-term genetic change may result from 
shorter-term epigenetics and tool use, and that exaptation can provide rich 
evolutionary resources, and may ultimately be inseparable from adaptation. As 
such, our argument supports the biosemiotic redefi nition of the neoconstructivist 
notion of scaff olding and, further on, the investigation of learning and education in 
view of the semiosic continuity of the environment that this involves. Considering 
all this, an account of learning emerges which is ecological and environmental 
rather than purely cognitive, rational and individual, and an account of adaptation 
emerges that comprises more than merely long-term observable physical species 
changes. Th is semiotic account, we consider, is compatible and complementary 
with other theories that bear on both learning and the environment, such as 
Gibson’s aff ordance theory (e.g., Gibson 1986, 2014 [1979]) Polanyi’s theory of 
knowledge (e.g., Polany 1946) and Bateson’s ecology of mind (Bateson 1972).8
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Обучение и адаптация с семиотической точки зрения
Данная статья рассматривает связь между обучением и адаптацией, утверждая, 
что новейшие разработки в семиотике указывают на отсутствие разрыва между 
ними. Обзор соответствующих теорий в этой области выявляет подход к обучению, 
связанный с вживанием и средой, где язык играет важную, но все же ограниченную 
роль. Обучение и адаптация рассматриваются как неотделимые случаи семиотического 
моделирования. Подобное конструирование этих явлений открывает новые пути в 
сторону недуалистической философии и теории образования.
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Õppimine ja adapteerumine semiootilisest vaatekohast
Artiklis vaadeldakse õppimise ja adapteerumise omavahelist suhet, väites, et semiootika 
uusimad seisukohad osutavad katkestuse puudumisele nende kahe nähtuse vahel. Ülevaade 
valdkonna suhtes olulistest teooriatest toob semiootika poolt vaadatuna esile kehastumuse 
(embodiment) ja keskkonnaga seotud arusaama õppimisest, milles keel mängib küll olulist, 
ent siiski piiratud osa. Õppimist ja adapteerumist vaadatakse semiootilise modelleerimise 
lahutamatute juhtumitena. Nende nähtuste seesugune konstrueerimine avab uusi arenguteid 
mittedualistliku fi losoofi a ja haridusteooria suunas.  
